Because of its capacity to facilitate consensus, trust in government is vital to the functioning of democracies. And yet those interested in the concept continue to struggle with the sheer number and ambiguity of available defi nitions. Th is paper confronts theoretical notions of trust with available empirical evidence, and ultimately defi nes "trust in government" as the willingness to bear the immediate or expected material and ideological costs that arise from compliance with government action. Th is defi nition is useful because it keeps up with recent empirical fi ndings, involves a particular channel of eff ect, and distinguishes trust in government from the positive perceptions and attitudes which are commonly confused with trust.
Introduction
Trust in government -more precisely, its lack or decline -continues to be frequently pointed out in connection with recent European events such as the euro area crisis, Brexit and the success of populist parties. Th e surge of research interest sparked by these events, however, has revealed a troubling ambiguity on the meaning of the term. Defi nitions from the 1990s remain widely cited despite both vagueness and the fact that they have not been confronted with more recent developments in the literature. If we wish to use trust in government to rationalize key events of our time, we ought to have a grasp on trust that extends beyond mere social intuition.
Th is literature review paper takes the reader on a guided cognitive journey toward a theoretical understanding of trust in government, which conforms with the results of up-to-date empirical research.
Attempts to take stock of our knowledge on trust have been undertaken before. Furlong (1996) reviews the conceptualization of generalized trust in economic thought, contrasting the calculative process of trust with its embeddedness in the social context. Rousseau et al. (1998) synthesize multidisciplinary views on trust within and between fi rms. Scholars of public administration, political science, economics, organizational studies, psychology and sociology alike have made noteworthy contributions to our current understanding of trust in government. Th ese contributions, however, exist in parallel. Th e topic remains multidisciplinary rather than interdisciplinary, suff ering from continued fragmentation.
In this paper I search for an interdisciplinary concept of trust in government that would bring the respective contributions together into a coherent whole. Drawing on an extensive survey of the social-science literature dealing with social, corporate and government trust, I compare and contrast theoretical concepts of trust with available empirical evidence. In particular, I select from the multidisciplinary melting pot those elements that are in line with the results of empirical studies, and I blend them into a "story" of how trust in government works.
Th e paper contributes to the existing literature by off ering a defi nition of trust in government and an interdisciplinary model of its formation that align with empirical evidence. Th is is of importance for two reasons. First, most trust defi nitions originate from the 1990s; they have not been revised to refl ect subsequent developments. Second, the proposed defi nition distinguishes trust in government from positive perceptions and attitudes such as approval, satisfaction, and legitimacy, which are oft en incorrectly identifi ed with trust.
Th e article proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefl y presents the main existing approaches to generalized and corporate trust and explains the shortcomings of available trust defi nitions. Section 3 reviews empirical research on the determinants and eff ects of trust in government. Section 4 contains the key insights; this is where I introduce the new defi nition of trust in government and the integrated process of its formation. Section 5 presents a short contemplation regarding the contemporary importance of trust, and section 6 concludes.
Existing defi nitions and approaches
Th e traditional economic approach to trust frames situations with trust as decision-making under uncertainty, employing subjective probabilities and elements of game theory. Th e decision to trust is the result of comparing expected costs and benefi ts under the assumption of self-interested utility-maximizing agents. Dasgupta (1988) and Hägg (1994) showcase this calculative approach by off ering the analysis of a buyer deciding to trust or not to trust a seller, that is to enter or not to enter into a contract with the latter, who may or may not cheat depending on his "type" (e.g. trustworthy or untrustworthy in Dasgupta; faithful, deceitful or calculating in Hägg) . From the contemporary point of view, however, such analysis is one of reputation, not trust, as issues of reputation pertain to asymmetric information and uncertainty with respect to another's type, while issues of trust relate to moral hazard and uncertainty about others' actions (Bursian and Faia 2015) .
Th e methodological individualism that is hard-wired in economics is difficult to apply to collective action in the public-sector environment. When perfect rationality and complete foresight are assumed, trusting is reduced to calculated risk-taking (Lorenz 1999) . With the homo economicus having no use for trust, the concept has naturally come to be of interest to the subdisciplines that question the validity of neoclassical assumptions.
Behavioral theories of trust overcome the limitations of self-interested agents without violating the rationality assumption (Evans and Krueger 2009) . Th ey do so by subsuming the payoff s of others into the individual's utility function (social preference theories) or by incorporating context and social norms as additional constraints (norm-based theories). A specifi c social preference, betrayal aversion (the tendency to derive extra disutility from non-reciprocated trust), is particularly important to human interaction (Fehr 2009 ). Despite valuable insights, focus on the individual has prevented behavioral economics from developing a comprehensive trust agenda that would be readily applicable to the government as an institutionalized object of trust.
Given frequent references to transaction costs in the trust literature, one would expect considerable input from transaction-costs economics. Th is has, however, not been the case. Following Williamson's work, transaction cost economists remain reserved to the concept (Bromiley and Harris 2006) . Williamson himself (1993, 463) labeled trust "redundant" and its use in economic relations "misleading".
Social-capital scholars, by contrast, devote considerable attention to trust as part of a broader framework. Although the social capital construct does not represent an approach to trust per se, the concepts of trust and social capital are tightly entwined. Trust is commonly regarded either as a key ingredient of social capital, or as a link between social capital and collective action (Ostrom and Ahn 2009) . In theory, trust and social capital are separate notions, but when faced with limited data availability, social capital researchers employ measures of trust as a proxy for social capital.
Organizational science off ers perhaps the most developed research eff ort on trust, relating the concept to vulnerability, risk, positive expectations, and interdependence. Th is approach lends itself most readily to the public-sector context: the state is, aft er all, a form of organization. Risk and interdependence are naturally present in the public sector, for the citizen-government relationship is, much like the principal-agent relationship, characterized by the possibility of exploitation, mismanagement, and ineffi ciency. Th ere is much to learn from organizational studies; however, not all principles are directly transferable to public administration (Grimmelikhuijsen and Knies 2017; Seyd 2016) . Table 1 provides the trust defi nitions one encounters in the social-science literature. Political economy "An effi cient means for lowering transaction costs in any social, economic and political relationship" Rousseau et al. (1998, 385) Organizational science "A psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another"
Political science "A simple decision rule for whether the person wants the government involved in a policy area or not"
Fehr ( Some of the defi nitions in Table 1 are perception-based (positive perception, positive expectations), while most are eff ect-focused (lowering transaction costs, accepting vulnerability, aiding decision-making, voluntary placement of resources, supporting interactions). Th e myriad of available defi nitions makes it time-consuming and laborious for authors to make sense of the phenomenon and leads them to rely on all-encompassing defi nitions (e.g. those of Fukuyama or Bouckaert). Unfortunately, these widely accepted and frequently cited defi nitions allow for ex-post rationalization (i.e. concluding that if an interaction ran smoothly or with low transaction costs, trust was involved) and interchangeableness of trust with approval, legitimacy or satisfaction.
As research eff orts shift ed toward empirical investigations, interest in the theoretical understanding of trust waned. It became common practice to cite a general defi nition of trust and to proceed without further ado to empirical tests, employing survey responses as measures of trust in government. Th is has generated a body of empirical research on trust in government with little connection to the underlying theoretical concept. One particular consequence of this weak link is the striking mismatch of theoretically alleged eff ects of trust in government and those for which empirical evidence is available. Table 2 shows that empirical research falls short of supporting several of the eff ects trust in government allegedly exerts.
Table 2
Comparison of Alleged and Empirically-Supported Eff ects of Trust in Government More rent-seeking, less government responsibility (Clark and Lee 2001) Increased government spending (Clark and Lee 2001) 
Overview of empirical research
Current scholarship recognizes the endogeneity of trust in government to policy outcomes and institutional factors. For the purposes of structure, however, I review studies on its determinants and eff ects in turn. Th e literature on determining factors tells the story of how trust in government is built and destroyed; while the work on its eff ects aids with the identifi cation of channels through which trust in government aff ects citizens' behavior, and consequently the functioning of the public sector, and the society overall.
Determinants of trust in government
Th eories of the emergence of trust in government may be broadly categorized as institutional or cultural. Institutional theories regard trust in government as determined from within the political system, while in cultural theories trust in government originates from cultural norms and thus is exogenous to the political system.
Cross-country regression estimates of the determinants of trust in government produce inconsistent results, as statistical signifi cance varies considerably with the model and dataset employed. Mishler and Rose (2001) fi nd evidence in favor of institutional theories for the post-communist countries. Blind (2006) cites studies providing evidence that governments which achieve economic growth are generally more trusted. Yet according to the OECD (2013) diff erences in the levels of trust in government refl ect neither living standards, nor GDP per capita, nor the growth rate of the economy; the determining factors appear to be culture, expectations and political conditions. Th is inconsistency of results suggests that regression models fail to capture the "ifs and buts" of trust-in-government formation. Singer (2011) as well as Hetherington and Rudolph (2008) explain that only the issues citizens deem salient aff ect trust in government; yet the issues citizens consider important naturally vary in both time and space. Tilley and Hobolt (2011) show that citizens tend to accommodate facts to their own political views, attributing successes to the politicians they favor and failures to those they oppose; objective measures of government performance may, therefore, perform poorly at explaining trust in government.
Concerned with generalized trust rather than trust in government, behavioral research has revealed trust to contain elements of beliefs as well as preferences. Th e belief component of trust pertains to the trustor's belief about the trustee's trustworthiness, which Butler et al. (2015) fi nd to be partly determined by the trustor's own trustworthiness. Th e preference component comprises the trustor's time, risk and social preferences (Albanese et al. 2017) . Th e behaviorist realization that trust is determined by both beliefs and preferences carries critical implications for empirical trust research. With preferences regarded as relatively stable and beliefs as shaped by the institutional context, researchers can no longer treat trust as exogenous to social, economic or political outcomes.
Effects of trust in government
Compliance with rules and regulations is by far the most frequently cited eff ect of trust in government. Research has shown that trust in government is associated with higher probability of tax compliance (Scholz and Lubell 1998) and lower tolerance toward fi scal fraud and false social security claims (Marien and Hooghe 2011) . Studies investigating the eff ect of trust in government on adherence to rules outside the fi scal domain are to my knowledge lacking (or perhaps remain unpublished).
Trust in government has traditionally been associated with support for more government. Research indeed shows that trust in local government increases citizens' support for greater government control over urban planning (Cooper et al. 2008) ; and that trusted governments perform more expansionary policies during times of low economic growth . Similarly, Hetherington (2001) claims that declining trust in government has led to the shrinking of the social and racial public-policy agendas in the United States. Contrary to popular wisdom, however, trust in government is associated with support for a bigger government, i.e. increased government spending (Rudolph and Evans 2005) , as well as for a smaller government, i.e. tax cuts (Rudolph 2009 ). Moreover, the link between trust in government and strength of support for policy reform appears to be subject to partisanship: it is present among liberals (but not conservatives) for tax cuts (Rudolph 2009), and among conservatives (but not liberals) for distributive spending (Rudolph and Evans 2005) , i.e. spending which benefi ts the general society (such as expenditure on road infrastructure) as opposed to specifi c population groups (e.g. minorities, the poor).
To my knowledge, and possibly due to issues of measurement, there is no empirical investigation of the eff ect of trust in government on its eff ectiveness, the extent of rent-seeking or the size of the shadow economy.
Toward an empirically-aligned defi nition of trust in government
Th e results of empirical research presented in the preceding section serve as a fi lter for the sheer amount of information and diff erent notions available in theory. To align with the empirics but not to deviate unnecessarily from our knowledge on generalized trust, the revised defi nition of trust in government should maintain the following commonly accepted features of trust: i) positivity;
ii) endogeneity;
iii) elements of both preferences and beliefs;
while successfully rationalizing existing results of empirical research, namely, iv) increased compliance with the tax code (but not necessarily with other regulations); v) increased support for policy reform leading to more as well as less government; vi) increased support for redistributive policies but less so for distributive policies;
vii) a support-for-reform eff ect that is subject to partisanship.
With respect to requirement iv), the further-unspecifi ed claim that trust in government encourages compliance with rules and regulations (Manning and Wetzel 2010; Bouckaert 2012; OECD 2017) seems an undue generalization. In the context of many regulations trust in government need not matter. Tax compliance is diff erent from, for example, adherence to speed limits. Speeding exposes the driver to potential punishment; the same is true for tax evasion. Paying tax exposes the taxpayer to potential exploitation in the form of rent-seeking, mismanagement or ineff ective spending; but respecting the speed limit does not expose the driver to the government's misconduct. Trust appears pertinent only to rules where compliance (not non-compliance) makes one vulnerable.
Embedded within requirement v), the observation that trust in government increases citizens' support for tax cuts challenges the conventional notion of trust as generating demand for more government. Th e key to reconciling these eff ects is to realize that increases in government spending and tax cuts alike entail material risk; the former of exploitation and the latter of an unforeseen reduction of goods and services (Rudolph 2009; Rudolph and Evans 2005) . Trust should thus be viewed more generally as increasing the support for budgetary changes that entail material risk, regardless of whether they aim to enlarge or reduce the public sector.
Turning to requirement vi), one should note that the expected cost of a policy proposal to the citizen is lower when they stand to benefi t directly from the policy on a personal level. While a limited number of citizens are eligible for redistributive programs (e.g. food stamps, welfare), the majority of the society do benefi t from distributive spending. Th us, for the citizenry at large, the expected cost of a redistributive policy is higher than the expected cost of a distributive policy, since in case of the latter, personal benefi t to some extent off sets the material risk of exploitation and mismanagement. Th is explains why trust in government increases support for redistributive policies but not distributive ones (Hetherington 2001 ): when less is at stake, there is less room for trust's support-eliciting role.
Under requirement vii), the eff ect of trust on support for policies with material risk should be subject to partisanship. Given that U.S. conservatives generally favor limited government, increased spending is ideologically costlier to them than tax cuts. U.S. liberals, on the other hand, advocate stronger government action, viewing higher government spending as ideologically less costly than tax cuts. Th e observation that trust in government increases support for higher government spending among conservatives and support for tax cuts among liberals (Rudolph and Evans 2005; Rudolph 2009 ) implies that trust in government is particularly eff ective in eliciting support from those who perceive the proposed reform as ideologically costlier. Ideological sacrifi ce works much like material risk.
An empirically-aligned defi nition of trust in government should, in respect of the above, allow for a support-eliciting role in situations that require the complying citizen to bear material risk or ideological sacrifi ce. I therefore propose defi ning "trust in government" as the willingness to bear material and ideological costs, immediate or expected, as the result of compliance with government action.
Integrative model of trust in government
To further the proposed defi nition, I select from the social-science literature on trust the elements which fulfi ll the requirements specifi ed in the beginning of section 4 and integrate them into a model of how trust in government is formed. Figure  1 off ers its schematic representation.
Figure 1
Integrative Model of Trust in Government A citizen's willingness to bear immediate or expected material and ideological costs as the result of compliance with government action stems from his / her propensity to trust coupled with positive expectations of the government's deeds (Mayer et al. 1995) . Propensity to trust refl ects the citizen's individual social, risk and time preferences (Fehr 2009; Albanese et al. 2017 ) and as such is a relatively stable component of trust. Expectations (i.e. beliefs about the future), on the other hand, are formed on the grounds of perceived government trustworthiness, which refl ects the government's ability, benevolence and integrity (Mayer et al. 1995) as perceived by the citizen. Grimmelikhuijsen and Knies (2017) show that measures of these three trustworthiness qualities do in fact relate to survey measures of trust in government (i.e. there is convergent validity).
Survey measures of trust seem to capture evaluations of incumbent political actors rather than attitudes toward the political system in general (Seyd 2016) . As ability, benevolence and integrity are attributes of individuals, in the model presented, "government" refers to those currently in power rather than to the long-lived institution of government. Nonetheless, the design of the political system is refl ected in citizens' trust to the extent to which it motivates leaders' conduct and hence determines government trustworthiness.
Citizens initially judge the government's ability on the grounds of its members' qualifi cations (knowledge and relevant experience), progressively also incorporating its successes and failures in terms of policy outcomes. Th ey evaluate benevolence with respect to the alignment of policies with their own values and judgment, which -in line with social preference theories -may take into account others' well-being and the common good. Integrity refers to absence of corruption, nepotism and the like.
Citizens need not perceive actual government trustworthiness accurately. Distortions occur when they receive false, misleading or incomplete information or when they accommodate facts to the political views they already hold. Th ey are also likely to rationally ignore or discount issues to which they attach no or little importance.
Trust is mentioned in connection with actual behavior far more oft en than approval, satisfaction or legitimacy, which are commonly identifi ed with trust in government. In the model, such attitudes and perceptions represent some of the determining factors of government trustworthiness (approval and satisfaction via benevolence; legitimacy via integrity) and aff ect behavior indirectly (via trust). Th e link from "trust in government" to "trusting behavior" is subject to contextual factors (Mayer et al. 1995) : the stakes involved, the balance of power between the citizens and the government, and the alternatives available to the citizens. Even trusting individuals will not act upon their trust when the costs of doing so are prohibitively high.
By increasing citizens' willingness to comply, trust in government has the capacity to aff ect policy outcomes at the societal level. Th is lends a nice touch to the concept of trust as the government's social capital; one may think of trust in government as a resource that allows the production of policies not feasible otherwise. When policy outcomes are deemed salient, they feed back into the citizens' assessment of government trustworthiness so that trust in government becomes self-reinforcing.
Discussion: On the contemporary importance of trust in government
Some authors hold the view that when the government's freedom to act is limited by law, citizens face fewer risks with respect to the government, and trust in government thus becomes redundant. In democratic countries, then, trust in government would explain very little of what is happening (Bouckaert et al. 2002) .
I argue the opposite. Because trust in government encourages individuals to play along despite the occasionally skinned knee, it is essential to regimes which base their functioning on consensus and refrain from the use of excessive force in securing compliance. By making liberals more likely to support conservative-like policies and conservatives more likely to support liberal-like reforms (Rudolph 2009; Rudolph and Evans 2005) , trust in government narrows the ideological chasm. As democratic decision-making requires consensus among a suffi ciently large group, the role of trust in government as a consensus-facilitating device is vital to contemporary democracies.
Since trust in government elicits willingness to comply particularly among individuals with high costs of compliance, its lack manifests as resistance from those who believe themselves to be disadvantaged by the current order. Recall, for example, the £350 million claim of the Vote Leave Brexit campaign or the successes of populist parties whose programs target "the people" ruled unjustly by "the elite". When trust in government is low, consequences of inequality in democracies magnify.
Conclusion
In contrast to the existing defi nitions of trust in government, the one proposed herein -the willingness to bear immediate or expected material and ideological costs as the result of compliance with government action -takes into account empirical research results, contains a specifi c mechanism of eff ect, and allows for trust's signifi cance in contemporary democracies.
Synthesized from existing approaches to trust on grounds of available empirical evidence, the proposed model leans toward institutional theories of trust formation, in which trust in government is endogenous to policy outcomes and the political system in place, but also acknowledges the exogenous cultural forces embodied in preferences and context. Trust in government arises from citizens' respective propensities to trust and their beliefs about government trustworthiness, which are subject to availability of information, perception biases, and issue salience. Conditional upon context, trust in government induces compliance and thus contributes to the success of policies requiring collective action.
Trust as willingness lies somewhere between trust as perception and trust as behavior: it is based on positive perceptions and may produce trusting behavior. Trust-as-perception is indistinguishable from approval, satisfaction and legitimacy, while trust-as-behavior misses the point that trusting citizens need not engage in trusting behavior, should the costs of doing so be prohibitive. In the overwhelming majority of cases, existing empirical support links trust with survey expressions of support, not with actual behavior.
Th e proposed defi nition is unusually specifi c as to the channel of trust's eff ect. Trust lowers transaction costs (Fukuyama 1995 in Blind 2006 and aff ects the interactions individuals, organizations and institutions in supporting ways (Bouckaert 2012) by making agents willing to cooperate despite possible costs. Th is consen-sus-facilitating and compliance-eliciting role of trust is vital to the functioning of democracies.
